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Adam Smith and the Theme of Corruption
Lisa Hill
Abstract: This paper seeks to locate Adam Smith’s thought within corruption debates
and traditions. The discussion commences by outlining the material and intellectual
context within which Smith wrote, after which it disputes claims that Smith may
be readily aligned with either a classical or proto-Marxist “corruption and decline”
tradition. The remainder of the paper is devoted to exploring in detail how he
approached the topic. It is argued that he does not ﬁt easily into any of the
recognizable corruption frameworks but that he forges one all his own, borne of his
anxieties about the activities of the English state in a rapidly expanding economy
and his desire to develop the new science of political economy.
This paper examines Adam Smith’s (1723–1790) approach to the subject of
corruption, a topic that has received little systematic scholarly attention. No
scholar, to my knowledge, has attempted to locate him within late modern
discourses of corruption; however, a number have sought to portray him as
a thinker with either a classical interest in the decline of nations or a
proto-Marxist interest in the effects of early capitalism. As I hope to show
here, although Smith certainly is interested in the corruption theme, his
framing of it does not ﬁt easily into any of the corruption categories familiar
to intellectual historians. This is partly because Smith is basically positive
about commercialism, in particular, and progress, in general; but it is also
because he has an eccentric notion of what political ﬂourishing and national
security entail.
Corruption
The term “corruption” has been notoriously difﬁcult to deﬁne,1 but scholars
have typically distinguished between classical andmodern senses of the term.
Until the end of the eighteenth century, “corruption” had a much broader
meaning than it does today; it referred “less to the actions of individuals”
than to the general moral health of the body politic judged according to “dis-
tributions of wealth and power, relationships between leaders and followers,
1Mark Philp, “Deﬁning Corruption: An Analysis of the Republican Tradition,”
International Political Science Association Research Roundtable on Political Finance and
Political Corruption (Bellagio, Italy, 1987).
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the source of power and the moral right of rulers to rule.”2Within the classical
tradition,3 the typical candidate for corruption is the prosperous, bloated
empire. Its usual triggers are aggressive militaristic expansion, ethnic
hubris, irreligiousness, hedonism, systemic inequalities of wealth, civic
withdrawal, overreliance on mercenary armies, distance between leaders
and citizenry, and a consequent loss of political virtue in both. Corruption
was not so much an individualized breach of duties as a condition that
spread contagiously and diffusely throughout the polity affecting leaders
and citizens alike. The narrower, modern conception with which we are
now familiar began to emerge in the eighteenth century. Modern corruption
is said to denote
behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique), pecuniary, or
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of
private-regarding inﬂuence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use
of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepo-
tism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather
than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public
resources for private-regarding uses).4
Adam Smith wrote at a time when the concept of corruption, under pressure
from two broad and related historical fronts, was undergoing a reﬁnement in
its meaning. The ﬁrst was the expansion of commercialism and British dom-
estic and foreign markets. As Britain’s empire and economy grew so did the
opportunities and scope for corruption. This, in turn, hastened the emergence
of new understandings of the relationship between private interests and
public duties. The second set of pressures was brought about by the birth
of the modern state, which was expanding rapidly and becoming more orga-
nized.5 With that expansion and increasing organization, the line between
private market and state affairs began to sharpen. Corresponding to these
changes was the emergence of protoliberal sensibilities that nurtured and pro-
moted such values as neutrality, impartiality, merit, and egalitarianism and
2Michael Johnston, “The Search for Deﬁnitions: The Vitality of Politics and the Issue
of Corruption,” International Social Science Journal 48 (1996): 322.
3As transmitted to the Enlightenment in the writings of such antique ﬁgures as
Plato, Thucydides, Lucretius, Posidonius, Tacitus, Polybius, Seneca, Epictetus, and
Cicero.
4Joseph Nye, “Political Corruption: A Cost Beneﬁt Analysis,” in Political Corruption:
A Handbook, ed. A.J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and V. Levine (New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction Books, 1989), 966.
5As reﬂected in its “expansion of material infrastructure and social administration”
(Paul Langford, “The Management of the Eighteenth-Century State: Perceptions and
Implications,” Journal of Historical Sociology 15 [2002]: 102–6,105). See also Joanna
Innes, “Changing Perceptions of the State in the Late Eighteenth and Early
Nineteenth Centuries,” Journal of Historical Sociology 15 (2002): 107–12, 112.
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pitted them against the absolutism, nepotism, particularism, and patronage
perceived to be attendant on feudal and aristocratic forms of governance.
Although most eighteenth-century thinkers continued to employ the term
“corruption” in its classical sense,6 reformers increasingly drew attention to
practices and institutions that would now qualify as sins against modern
sensibilities.
Concern with corruption is, of course, millennia old. Many classical writers
took for granted that prosperous states were doomed to tip into decline;
accordingly, an exploration of its causes was a ubiquitous theme in antique
literature. Closer to Smith’s time, it was a common seventeenth-century
view that the world was in its dotage,7 and the idea of degeneration was
still popular in the eighteenth century.8 Britain was expanding rapidly in
the eighteenth century; because of its increasing prosperity and imperialistic
tendencies, writers like Edward Gibbon and Adam Ferguson drew parallels
between ancient Rome and contemporary Britain. Many eighteenth-century
thinkers believed that the decline of Republican Rome could be traced to
the triumph of Epicureanism over Stoicism. Epicureanism taught prodigality,
described a godless world governed by chance, reduced morality to hedon-
ism, and deﬁned all good as private. Conversely, the cures for the ills of the
ailing polity were seen to lie in the restoration of civic virtue as deﬁned by
Stoicism.9 This opposition was popular in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century moral and political discourse and was reﬂected in a neo-Puritan
revival that condemned hedonism and overconsumption and perceived in
the attitudes of the British populace a renaissance of the Epicurean impera-
tive.10 As a consequence, the dissipation of virtue became one of the most
urgent problems of political philosophy in the eighteenth century11 with
ﬁgures like Viscount Bolingbroke, John Brown, and Adam Ferguson discour-
sing on the perils of hedonism and luxury.12 In his Essay on the History of Civil
Society (1767), Ferguson (Smith’s friend and compatriot) focused on the
decline of nations and the vitiating effects of luxury, imperialism, military
6Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1977), 40.
7John Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.,
1979), 198.
8Lois Whitney, Primitivism and the Idea of Progress (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1934), 43.
9See, for example, Adam Ferguson, The History of the Progress and Termination of the
Roman Republic (London: Jones and Company, 1834), 169–70.
10Lawrence Dickey, “Historicising the ‘Adam SmithfXE “Smith”gProblem’:
Conceptual, Historiographic, and Textual Issues,” The Journal of Modern History 58
(1986): 579–609, 606.
11J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1975), 462.
12John Sekora, Luxury (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 93.
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specialization, and political apathy.13 Smith has also been associated with this
classical approach to corruption, but, as I will show, he was basically optimis-
tic about the effects of progress and, speciﬁcally, commercialism. His is a more
modern, though slightly eccentric, vision representing his determination to
work toward two goals: ﬁrst, to make a decisive break with the past and
traditional etiologies of social disorder, and second, to develop the science
of political economy.
Corruption—and its eradication—was one of the most pressing problems
for political theorists of the eighteenth century, many of whom portrayed
England as “shot through with corruption and venality.”14 Alarmed by this
state of affairs, some thinkers approached the issue exclusively through the
lens of civic humanism, focusing on the general problem of hedonism and
prosperity and the consequent loss of political virtue,15 while others conﬁned
their attention to the regularization and reform of political institutions.16 But
many saw the issues as closely interrelated, and the term “corruption” often
denoted a generalized loss of virtue in the polity (classical) exempliﬁed and
exacerbated by the widespread abuse of public ofﬁce for private gain
(modern). In this period, then, the distinction between classical and modern
conceptions of corruption seems to have become a fairly unstable one.
Doubtless, the narrowing of the deﬁnition of corruption was aided by
the fact that eighteenth-century English politics was seen as “a racket, run
by particular groups within the ruling classes largely for their own
beneﬁt.”17 The most signiﬁcant topic in the reform debate of the eighteenth
century was political and especially parliamentary reform. When Smith
was writing, the salient issues were a desire for greater parliamentary inde-
pendence; the regularization of electoral boundaries; suffrage reform; and
the general eradication of “Old Corruption,” a term coined in the nineteenth
century by William Cobbett to denote an English state implicated in
13Lisa Hill, The Passionate Society: The Social, Political and Moral Thought of Adam
Ferguson (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), c. 10.
14Wilfred Prest, “Judicial Corruption in Early Modern England,” Past and Present,
133 (1991): 67–95, 68.
15For a fuller discussion of political corruption in its mainly classical sense in the
early eighteenth century, see J. G. A. Pocock, “Virtue and Commerce in the
Eighteenth Century,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 3 (1972): 119–34; and
Maurice Goldsmith, “Public Virtue and Private Vices: Bernard Mandeville and
Political Ideologies in the Early Eighteenth Century,” Eighteenth Century Studies 9
(1976): 477–510.
16See, for example, Miles Ogborn, “Wherein Lay the Late Seventeenth-Century
State? Charles Davenant Meets Streynsham Master,” Journal of Historical Sociology 15
(2002): 96–101, 98–99.
17Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, eds., “From Theatre to Machine: Old
Corruption,” in The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 89.
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such practices as the extension to political cronies of government sinecures,
reversions,18 “pensions, government contracts, and church preferments.”19
English electoral politics was riven with corruptions like rotten boroughs,
patronage, bribery, and the treating of loyal voters,20 while reformers were
alert to the more general issues of the use of arbitrary power and the
control of state institutions by party factions.21 Public debt and government
proﬂigacy also attracted critical attention. The ongoing project of militaristic
expansion led to an increasingly large public debt and, with it, rising taxes
and an exacerbation of the system of patronage,22 all of which contributed
to the perception of a vitiated and bloated state at odds with the interests
of its public.23 Though critics like Adam Smith saw the English state as an
archaic and cumbersome constraint on economic life,24 at least one aspect
of its administration was (negatively) perceived to be well managed.
In order to ﬁnance its war efforts, the eighteenth-century English state
had developed a relatively efﬁcient and professional system of tax
gathering.25 So, for much of the eighteenth century, a view prevailed that
18Denoting “the right of succession to an ofﬁce or place of emolument after the death
or retirement of a holder” which allowed ofﬁce holders to pass on valuable positions to
family members (Eckhart Hellmuth, “Why Does Corruption Matter? Reforms and
Reform Movements in Britain and Germany in the Second Half of the Eighteenth
Century,” in Reform in Great Britain and Germany 1750-1850, ed. T. C. W. Blanning
and Peter Wende (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 19–21.
19Ibid., 22–23.
20J. A. Phillips, “The Structure of Electoral Politics in Unreformed England,” The
Journal of British Studies 19 (1979): 76–100.
21Innes, “Changing Perceptions of the State,” 109.
22Much of the national debt was offset by public credit that increased the crown’s
patronage powers (Pocock, “Virtue and Commerce,” 119–20). For further discussion
of the problems of patronage in the seventeenth century, see L. L. Peck, Court
Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1979).
23Hellmuth, “Why Does Corruption Matter?” 19–21. See also John Brewer, Party,
Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976), 249ff.
24See, for example, Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), II. iii.
35–36: 334–35. (see 17.129, 15th ed.). However, it allows for a mix of roman and arabic
if the work has complex divisions, as this work has. I have, therefore, left your citation
as is.] Hereafter, cited as WN. This is a characterization that some historians have
rejected. See Innes, “Changing Perceptions,” 112; and Langford, “The Management
of the Eighteenth-Century State,”105. fXE “Liberty”g
25Quoted from Hellmuth, “Why Does Corruption Matter?” 8. See also John Brewer,
The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688–1783 (London: Century
Hutchinson, 1988). For a discussion of the birth of the modern state as a consequence
of the need for a more efﬁcient taxation system, see Ogborn, “Wherein Lay the late
Seventeenth-Century State?” passim.
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the British government, in all its forms, was “parasitical,” proﬂigate, and
existed only to “shamelessly” serve and enrich a select elite.26
Smith shared in this perception, berating the English State’s “wastefulness
and its hypocritical attempts to control the personal spending “of private
people.”27 He believed that most public institutions contained the potential
for “neglicency and corruption”28 and disliked any “profusion of govern-
ment.”29 Smith saw government proﬂigacy as synonymous with corruption30
and drew attention to practices that would now qualify as forms of modern
corruption, criticizing the practice of sinecure granting,31 the domination of
parliament by sectional (i.e., private economic) interests32 as well as its
unrepresentative nature.33 Judicial bribery34 was another popular eighteenth-
century corruption issue that he showed some interest in, speciﬁcally describ-
ing it as a form of “corruption.”35 The problem of public debt was a particular
concern for Smith because of its tendency to drive up taxes, which in turn led
to the ﬂight of domestic capital and a consequent devaluation of the domestic
currency.36 The long-term effect of this dynamic was the potential ruination of
26Pocock, “Virtue and Commerce,” 119–20.
27WN, II. iii. 35–36: 344–46.
28Adam Smith to William Cullen, September 20, 1774, The Correspondence of Adam
Smith fXE “Smith”g, ed. E. C. Mossner and I. S. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987), no. 143. Hereafter, The Correspondence will be cited as Correspondence.
29WN, II. iii. 36: 345.
30WN, V. ii. k. 64: 898.
31WN, V. i. b: 719. “Publick services are never better performed than when their
reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to
the diligence employed in performing them.”
32WN, IV. ii. 43: 471; WN, IV. vii. b. 49: 584; WN, IV. viii. 17: 647; WN, V. i.e. 4: 733.
Smith remarked with reference to Great Britain that “[i]n a Country where Clamour
always intimidates and faction often oppresses the Government, the regulations of
Commerce are commonly dictated by those who are most interested to deceive and
impose upon the Public” (Letter no. 248 addressed to Le Duc de la Rochefoucauld,
November 1, 1785, Correspondence). Smith wrote to William Eden that laws governing
trade “may, I think, be demonstrated to be in every case a complete piece of dupery, by
which the interest of the State and the nation is constantly sacriﬁced to that of some
particular class of traders” (Letter no. 233, December 15, 1783, Correspondence).
33Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and L. G.
Stein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), v. 134–35: 323–24. Hereafter, cited as
LJ (A).
34Which, by Smith’s time, had already been deﬁned by William Blackstone in
modern terms as occurring “when a judge, or other person concerned in the adminis-
tration of justice, takes any undue reward to inﬂuence his behavior in ofﬁce” (William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. [Oxford, 1765–69], 4: 139–40,
cited in Prest, “Judicial Corruption in Early Modern England,” 67–68).
35LJ (A), V. 23: 279; LJ (B), 67: 423; WN, V. i. b: 719.
36WN, V. iii. 55–56, 60: 927–30.
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agriculture, trade, and “manufactures.”37 Heavy taxes create unnecessary
and burdensome layers of administration, encourage smuggling, “obstruct
the industry of the people” (thereby exacerbating unemployment), and
subject the populace to the “odious” and oppressive scrutiny of the tax-
gatherers.38 Thus, Smith shared with his contemporaries many of the
concerns about corruption. Nevertheless, he seems to have been working
with an eccentric perception of what the problem of corruption was really
about. Before exploring what this was, it makes sense to examine ﬁrst why
his does not conform to standard and competing conceptions of the idea.
A Classical, Proto-Marxist or Pessimistic Smith?
A number of scholars have argued that Smith is pessimistic about the corrupt-
ing tendencies of the commercial age and even that he perceives in capitalism
the seeds of its own inevitable destruction.39 This seems to me to be an exag-
geration of Smith’s attitude to commercial progress. While Smith does not
close his eyes to the disadvantages of the commercial age (as will be shown
presently), nevertheless, there are a number of reasons to cleave to the stan-
dard characterization of Smith as optimistic about the future prospects of
the commercial polity.40 To begin with, in contrast to classical accounts, he
sees the traditional threats to prosperous empires as either receding or no
longer present in Britain’s case. A common cause of decline in classical
accounts is the professionalization of armies. Yet Smith denied that standing
professional armies threatened either the virtue or security of the polity.41
37James Alvey, “Adam Smith’s Three Strikes against Commercial Society,”
International Journal of Social Economics 25 (1998): 1425–41, 1432; WN, V. iii. 10: 911.
38WN, V. ii. b. 6: 826–27.
39For proto-Marxian interpretations, see Spencer J. Pack, Capitalism as a Moral
System: Adam Smith’s Critique of the Free Market Economy (Aldershot: Edward Elgar,
1991); and Robert Heilbroner, “The Paradox of Progress: Decline and Decay in the
Wealth of Nations,” Journal of the History of Ideas 34 (1973): 243–62. For interpretations
that posit a general pessimism, see DonaldWinch, “Adam Smith’s Problem and Ours,”
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 44 (1997): 384–402; Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith’s
Discourse (Routledge: London, 1994); Nathan Rosenberg, “Adam Smith on the Division
of Labor: Two Views or One,” Economica 33 (February 1965): 127–39; James Alvey,
“Adam Smith’s View of History; Consistent or Paradoxical,” History of the Human
Sciences 16 (2003): 1–25; and, by the same author, “Adam Smith’s Three Strikes”:
1425–44.
40As best exempliﬁed by Joseph Cropsey when he argued that, despite Smith’s
acknowledgement of the many defects of commerce, he saw it as the best way to “gen-
erat[e] freedom and civilisation” (Joseph Cropsey, Polity and Economy: An Interpretation
of the Principles of Adam Smith [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957], 95).
41As civic humanists of the seventeenth and eighteenth century had insisted upon.
See Lois Schwoerer, “No Standing Armies!”: The Anti-Army Ideology in Seventeenth
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Not only do they provide better security than citizen militias, but they
also generate positive changes in the social fabric. By releasing citizens
from public duties, standing armies permit people to get on with their inde-
pendent commercial pursuits while, at the same time, engendering the high
levels of trust, order, liberty, and security necessary for such pursuits to
ﬂourish.42
Another important source of corruption in classical accounts of empire
decline—systemic inequality—does not seem to have bothered Smith.43
Rather than threatening the commercial state Smith believed that rank
distinctions and wealth inequalities were a natural product of modernity
due to equally natural developments in the accumulation, maintenance,
and legal regulation of private property.44 They were a vital ingredient of
economic growth45 and provided indispensable support to social stability,
“peace and order” in advanced and increasingly mass societies such as
interested him.46
Further, although Smith objected to the public debt problem, partly
brought on by England’s extensive military entanglements, he did not
regard its effects as necessarily fatal.47 Rather, he seems to have expected
the natural and inevitable growth of commerce to provide the necessary
Century England (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974); and John
Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (Edinburgh: John Donald,
1985).
42WN, I. xi. i: 256. See also WN, xi. g: 213–14; WN, V. i. a. 41: 706–7.
43This is not the same as saying that Smith was unconcerned about the problem of
poverty among the lower classes. As Samuel Fleischaker, On Adam Smith’s Wealth of
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 205–8, has argued convincingly,
Smith’s concern for the poor—novel among his contemporaries—ran deep. But Smith
thought that the maintenance of social hierarchies (so long as they were accompanied
by other structures and policies that permitted the poor to gain independence) were
important for the achievement of the kind of economic growth and prosperity that
was capable of beneﬁting everybody, especially the poor. The mechanism at work
here is invidious comparison. In a class system that tolerates and protects the existence
of models for emulation (the rich), the laboring poor will toil endlessly in order to save
(but never ultimately consume) those items of “ostentatious avidity” (Adam Smith,
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. MacFie [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1976], I. iii. 3.2: 62) enjoyed by their social superiors [I. iii. 2.1:
50–51]). Hereafter, The Theory of Moral Sentiments is cited as TMS.
44LJ (A) 26: 340.
45See above at note 44.
46TMS, VI. ii. 1.21: 226; LJ (B): 210, 489.
47Such a prodigious waste of “capital . . . must, undoubtedly, have retarded the
natural progress of England towards wealth and improvement”; however, “it has
not been able to stop it” (WN, II. iii. 36: 345).
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correction.48 Commercial states, with their particular interest in free trade, are
more likely to seek alliances than to prosecute wars. Indeed the “state of
peace” is synonymous with the state of “commerce.”49
Finally, it is hard to imagine that luxury and hedonism will be problems for
a writer who apparently deﬁnes happiness in terms of material abundance50
and who promotes and celebrates the pursuit of the “natural joy of prosper-
ity.”51 He continually emphasized that luxury was a relative thing, more
likely to reﬂect a healthy, ﬂourishing state than one in imminent danger of col-
lapse.52 Condemning those “popular ascetic doctrines . . . which placed virtue
in the entire extirpation and annihilation of all our passions,” Smith declares
that it is “certain that luxury, sensuality, and ostentation are public beneﬁts”
for they encourage the vital “arts of reﬁnement” upon which progress
depends.53
Smith does not see the declining or stationary state as a likelihood. Though
some states would fail to progress due to environmental disadvantages and
the effects of poor management, there is, in general, a “natural progress of
improvement”;54 indeed, the retrogressive state is the “unnatural” state.55
48For a fuller discussion of why commercial expansion is both natural and inevitable
in most settings, see Lisa Hill, “Further Reﬂections on the Hidden Theology of Adam
Smith,” European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 11 (2004): 629–35.
49WN, IV. iii. c. 11: 494.
50WN, I. viii. 36: 96.
51TMS, I. iii. 2.1: 51. Yet it is worth bearing in mind that Smith’s position on “happi-
ness” is more complicated than this because elsewhere he also tells us that “[i]n what
constitutes the real happiness of human life, [the poor] are in no respect inferior to
those who would seem so much above them” (TMS, IV. 1. 10: 185, emphasis
added). Nevertheless, because Smith ultimately sees the wealth-equals-happiness
arrangement as beneﬁcial and even vital in terms of its effects on social systems
(a deception engineered by the divine architect for the general beneﬁt of humanity),
for the purposes of this discussion, it is acceptable to characterize his attitude to
happiness in terms of the wealth-equals-happiness position.
52For example, see WN, I. i. 11: 23–24; WN, I. viii. 35: 95–96.
53TMS, VII. ii. 4.12: 313. It should be pointed out, however, that although in his early
works Smith is complacent about luxury consumption, in the Wealth of Nations, he
added the important qualiﬁcation that it was only the desire for, rather than actual
consumption of, luxury goods among workers and merchants that could be deemed
positive. This is because he has decided that saving, rather spending, encourages
growth. Only among the rich was luxury spending condoned because their “ostenta-
tious consumption” would “act as a spur to others, not to imitate such behavior, but to
work harder” (Anthony Brewer, “Luxury and Economic Development; David Hume
and Adam Smith,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 45 (1998): 78–98, 78–79.
54WN, V. i. a. 43: 708.
55WN, III. I. 9: 380. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Hill, “Further
Reﬂections.” Though Smith never properly deﬁnes what the term “natural” in this
context means, in general, “natural” seems to denote a state where the innate urges
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Yet Smith was not oblivious to the disadvantages of progress, observing that
commercialization, and in particular the growth of cities, could have perni-
cious effects on moral character. The “spirit” of commercialism—as well as
its characteristic mode of production (specialization)—has a detrimental
effect because it “sinks the courage of mankind and tends to extinguish
martial spirit.”56 The new independence of working children undermines
the traditional “authority” of fathers with the effect that the young, when
at leisure, fall into bad habits of “drunkenness and riot.”57 The commercial
age is posited as the age of declining literacy. Among the “lower” metro-
politan orders, the education of children is “greatly neglected” because the
division of labor “affords an opportunity of employing children very
young.”58 This, in turn, leaves people with no ideas of “amusement . . . but
riot and debauchery.”59 Though Smith thought commercialization was
natural, inevitable, and basically positive,60 he was keenly aware of “the dis-
advantages of a commercial spirit.” “The minds of men are contracted and
rendered incapable of elevation, education is despised or at least neglected,
and heroic spirit is almost utterly extinguished.”61 Such effects were felt
most acutely by workers involved in specialized “manufactory” labor (to
be discussed further).
Although Smith does show some interest in the link between economic
growth and corruption, his conception falls outside usual usages of and taxo-
nomies associated with the term. Of the latter, we have seen that the classical
and modern dichotomy is the most common. Yet he has much in common
with both versions. Apart from using the term “corruption” in the common
usage sense as decay from an ideal or original condition, Smith also uses
the term in both the classical62 and modern senses.63 His literal invocation
of the term (and its cognates) does not, therefore, offer many clues as to his
place within corruption debates because he clearly understands—and
of human agents are given free reign, unencumbered by human interference and the
large scale schemes of either legislators, market monopolizers or dependency
generators.
56LJ (B), 1766, 331: 540.
57LJ (B), 330: 540.
58LJ (B), 329: 539–40.
59LJ (B), 329–30: 539–40.
60For a fuller defense of this view, see Hill, “Further Reﬂections,” 629–35.
61LJ (B), 333: 541.
62For example, WN, V. i. a. 38: 705; WN, V. i. f. 47: 781; Adam Smith, Letter to the
Edinburgh Review, in Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. I. S. Ross (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1980), 250; TMS. III. 1: 61–62.
63WN, V. i. b. 17–20: 718–20;WN, V. ii. b. 4.: 825–26;WN, V. ii. k. 62: 897;WN, V. iii.
61: 931; LJ (A) v. 23: 279; Letter to William Cullen, no. 143, September 20, 1774,
Correspondence).
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indeed refers to—corruption in both senses. It makes more sense, then, to
eschew a content analysis approach in favor of one that seeks to comprehend
more broadly what his vision of the ideal polity is and what he perceives to be
its greatest threats.
When we read Smith with this in mind, we can appreciate that he chooses
to think about corruption in an eccentric way that might be thought of as a
hybrid conception. In terms of his overall approach, he is using it in the
classical sense as a deviation from an ideal state and as a condition that
affects the entire polity, corrupting the virtue of leaders and citizenry alike.
However, the causes of corruption are quite different from those normally
identiﬁed in the classical model. Indeed, such causes (i.e., luxury, irreligious-
ness, standing armies, civic withdrawal) are generally seen by Smith as
benign and, in some cases, beneﬁcial. Further, the virtues he identiﬁes as
vulnerable to corruption are not classical and civic but modern and commer-
cial ones (see below). Though it is probably fair to say that he does adopt the
healthy versus corrupt dichotomy,64 and even agrees that the former is
upheld by the virtue of its members, such virtue is not a recognizably classical
type. His good republic bears little or no resemblance to the classical ideal. In
fact it is a comparatively tepid model, politically speaking, relying as it does
on a well-regulated leadership and a quiescent, orderly, self-governing public
of private, self-regarding subjects. While Smith is deﬁnite that virtue is the
main guard against social and economic corruption, the virtues he valorizes
and promotes are commercial rather than civic ones—the tame, cool virtues
of the middling ranks. Furthermore, they are generated outside politics and
exclusivistic social units like the village, the umma, or the feudal estate,
which are the usual matrixes of virtue in classical narratives of corruption.
Neither are his virtues realized through the transcendence of market
relations, class hierarchies, and specialized labor, as per Marxian accounts.
Finally, unlike most thinkers working within a classical framework, he does
not regard corruption in prosperous nations as inevitable (although Smith
does see national decline as a possibility and expends some energy in outlin-
ing how it might be avoided). There is no portent of impending palingenesis,
no cycle of decline and renewal, and no pessimistic eschatology lurking
beneath his narrative. Rather, his discourse on the likely causes of corruption
is framed within a lineal and progressive historiography.65 He is reaching
towards a broadly modern conception of corruption that is made necessary
by the growth of the market, the emergence of the modern state, and his
desire to prevent the latter from stiﬂing the former. As both state and
64As Shumer notes: “Corruption must be understood in relationship to its mirror-
image concept, the healthy republic” (S. M. Shumer, “Machiavelli; Republican
Politics and Its Corruption,” Political Theory 7 [1979]: 5–34 [see especially p. 8]).
65For further elaboration of this point, see Hill, “Hidden Theology,” passim and
“Further Reﬂections,” passim.
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market activity expands, Smith’s political economy is an attempt to clarify
their relationship, to quarantine the private from the public realm in order
to liberate the market and individual actors so that they could, at last, work
properly or naturally.
It seems that Smith’s picture of corruption is best understood in relation to
his attempt to establish the science of political economy, which is morally
neutral (at least to his mind) and divorced from standard moralistic virtue
narratives or normative critiques of progress and commercialization.
Corruption consists in violations of the system of natural liberty, including
violations that corrupt the naturally self-governing behavior of individual
actors. In other words, corruption is instigated by obstructions to the
natural course of progress rather than by progress itself; accordingly, more
progress is generally his solution to any of the pathologies of modernity.
The problem is not modernity, prosperity, hedonism, martial specialization,
civic withdrawal, commercialism, or any of the other triggers of corruption
in classical accounts but rather lack of commercial progress, a lack of moder-
nity, and a lack of withdrawal into private and individuated concerns.
Precommercial social and political arrangements generate corruption
because of their tendency to discourage individual autonomy on the one
hand, and interfere with the natural laws of the market, on the other.
Numbered among these corrupting remnants of precommercial stages are
religious fanaticism and sectarianism; political faction, and monolithic, pater-
nalistic, and intrusive forms of governance, including any institutional and
legal impediments to the free play of the market and the development of inde-
pendent moral character. Such impediments include monopolies, poor laws,
corporation laws, apprenticeship laws, and regulations governing the insti-
tutions of entail and primogeniture. These restrictions could not only
corrupt individual agents, but they could also threaten the prosperity and
security of entire nations. Though all of these feudal phenomena persisted
in commercial societies, Smith’s point was that they did not naturally
belong in them. In his view they needed to be purged in order to deliver
society into its natural state and thereby secure the commercial stage from
decline, in the long term, and to prevent consumers from being victimized
by its effects, in the short.66 Notwithstanding the necessity for some degree
of positive justice, the good polity is not so much a set of institutional arrange-
ments carefully orchestrated by hubristic lawgivers as a natural market
economy of individuated, self-regarding, specialized, lawful, and mutual for-
bearing agents. Finally, although Smith identiﬁes two additional and modern
sources of moral corruption (urbanization and the division of labor), he insists
that their effects are far from fatal and could be satisfactorily addressed within
existing social arrangements (to be discussed further). In other words, they are
not indicative of a neoclassical “corruption and decline” narrative in Smith.
66WN, IV. V. iii. 49: 660.
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Thus Smith’s idea of corruption seems to be best understood as a combi-
nation of a classical, modern, and technical dictionary deﬁnition, namely, as
a virtue-corrupting condition that radiates diffusely throughout society (clas-
sical) representing a deviation from a sound or natural condition (technical),67
the broad outlines of which are recognizably laissez-faire liberal (modern). He
does not really posit an ideal or sound constitution from which societies
deviated or toward which they might judiciously gravitate. He is more
interested in deviations from the invisible and omnipresent laws of nature,
which he believed governed the entire universe, including societies, econom-
ies, and even individual agents. There is a natural, spontaneous order that
should not be unduly interfered with; namely, the system of natural liberty
and the market.
The System of “Natural Liberty”: The Market as a Natural,
Uncorrupted Order
Smith apparently believed that beneath the complex of seemingly arbitrary
social arrangements and artiﬁcially imposed institutional constraints on
human behavior there was a system of natural and spontaneous economic
relations which, when allowed to operate, would function reasonably harmo-
niously. He was intensely averse to system and the utopian schemes of legis-
lators, deriding the hubris of the social engineer who “fancies himself the only
wise and worthy man in the Commonwealth” in assuming “that his fellow
citizens should accommodate [themselves] to him and not he to they.”68
There exists a natural equilibrium with which both legislators and private
individuals should, for the most part, avoid interfering; each person is by
nature the best judge of her own interest and should, therefore, be left unhin-
dered to pursue it in her own way. She is able in this manner to achieve, not
only her own best advantage, but that of society as well. It was this belief in a
natural economic order which led Smith to make his celebrated statement that
in pursuing her own advantage each individual was “led by an invisible hand
to promote an end which was no part of [her] intention,” namely, the general
welfare and prosperity of the nation.69
Corresponding to this natural order, Smith refers to the “natural rights” of
individuals, whereby each person has the liberty to act in a way that is con-
sistent with her self-regarding inclinations. People have a “natural right” to
67The term “corruption” is “rooted in the sense of a thing being changed from its
naturally sound condition, into something unsound, impure, debased, infected,
tainted, adulterated, depraved [or] perverted” (Mark Philp, “Deﬁning Political
Corruption,” in Political Corruption, ed. Paul Heywood [Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 1997], 20–46, 24–25).
68TMS, VI. ii. 217: 234.
69WN, IV. ii. 9: 456.
648 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
“free commerce”70 and to enjoy their “liberty free from infringement.”71 In a
system of “just liberty,” agents should not be hindered in the use of “[t]he
property which every man has in his own labor” and which is the “most
sacred and inviolable” of all forms of property.72 Since humans are psycholo-
gically disposed to specialize their economic effort, it is their natural right to
exchange any resulting vendibles with the products of the specialized effort of
others. It follows, then, that, provided “there is no injury to [ones] neigh-
bours,”73 there can be no legitimate interference with exchange either by
private persons or public bodies. Smith deplored regulations such as poor
laws, corporation privileges, statutes of apprenticeship, and restrictions
on international trade. He further insisted that private interests could be
just as noxious to the system of natural liberty as an overbearing state and
cautioned against “the spirit of monopoly,” berating the “mean rapacity”
and “monopolising spirit of merchants and manufacturers.”74 As a result of
the dispensation of monopoly grants and the arbitrary bestowal of “extraordi-
nary privileges” and “restraints” upon different sectors of industry by
government, some individuals were able to enrich themselves without at
the same time enriching the nation.75
Smith condemned all these impositions and restrictions as corruptions of
natural social laws and violations of the personal rights of individuals.
They are not only extremely “hurt[ful] to the natural state of commerce”76
but are usually obtained via corrupt (i.e., nonfree market) means, namely,
through patronage, electoral, and related forms of bribery.77
70LJ (A), 12–13: 8.
71LJ (B), 11: 401; LJ (A), i. 24: 13.
72WN, I. x. c. 12: 138; WN, IV. v. b. 43: 540.
73WN, I. x. c. 12: 138.
74WN, IV. iii. c. 9: 493.
75The East India Company with its powerful, state-protected monopoly of British/
Asian commerce was a prime target for Smith. See, for example,WN, IV. vii. c. 91: 631;
WN, IV. vii. c. 107: 641. Its privileged position led to a situation whereby consumers not
only “paid” for the company’s “extraordinary proﬁts . . . but for all the extraordinary
waste which the fraud and abuse, inseparable from the management of the affairs of so
great a company, must necessarily have occasioned (WN, IV. vii. c. 91: 631). Smith
lamented that the company was powerful enough to impose such “improper regu-
lations” and “injudicious restraints” as to induce a “famine” (WN, IV. v. b. 6: 527).
“Monopolists” are also criticized for the fact that they “very seldom make good
work” (Letter to William Cullen, September 20, 1774, no. 143, Correspondence). For a
full exploration of Burke’s equally critical attitude, see Frederick Whelan, Edmund
Burke and India: Political Morality and Empire (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh,
1996).
76LJ (B), 306–7: 529.
77Whereby “stockholders of the competing Old and New East India companies” bid
“for the votes of small and corrupt boroughs in order to secure the controlling interest
in Parliament” thereby enabling them “to wipe out their competitors in the lucrative
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Though Smith seems aware of the problem of corruption on an individual
level, he sees the issue as more of a systemic problem, focusing almost exclu-
sively on its legalized and normal forms. He rarely portrays modern corrup-
tion as a breach of individual morality or an offence against the judgments of
the impartial spectator but rather as a function of either legally sanctioned
market manipulation or an absence of regular, impartial justice. For
example, monopolies exist because they are ofﬁcially sanctioned; judicial cor-
ruption arises not because judges are immoral but because the norms of beha-
vior pertaining to court fees and “gifts” and payments are “arbitrary and
uncertain”;78 because the fees paid to “attorneys and clerks” are unregulated,
the latter naturally succumb to the “temptation” of rent-seeking.79 The irregu-
larity and “uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence” and “corrup-
tion” of tax collectors80 while “negligency and corruption” within
universities are rife because the sector is artiﬁcially oligopolized and lacks a
system of regularly constituted inspections or “[v]isitations.”81 Accordingly,
corruption could only be eradicated at the social-system level via appropriate
corrections to the legal framework; this would, in turn, presumably, change
norms. Moral sentiments alone are incapable of policing the problem of
corruption as Smith understands it; they need the proper legal (albeit spare
and restrained) framework in order to function properly.
Smith recognized the norm- and class-bound nature of corruption, noting
that it was not a signiﬁcant problem among people in the “middling and
inferior stations of life” where the “road to virtue and that to fortune” is gen-
erally one and the same. Such people are generally not above the law and are,
therefore, less inclined to break it. Moreover, their success is usually depen-
dent, not on birth or wealth, but on their own “real and solid professional
abilities” coupled with the “favour and good opinion of their neighbours
and equals,” something that cannot be obtained “without a tolerably
regular conduct.”82 The standards of impartial spectator surveillance that
are exercised over (and by) these classes are much stricter and less forgiving
than those which are supposed to constrain the vices of people in “exalted
stations.”83 Those who are either above the law or are in a position to
manipulate it in order to serve their own ends are responsible for most
of the corruption that Smith has in mind. The impartial spectator is helpless
trade to the East Indies” (Laura Curtis, ed. The Versatile Defoe [London: George Prior,
1979], 244).
78WN, V. i. b. 16: 718.
79WN, V. i. b. 22: 721.
80WN, V. ii. b. 4: 825–26.
81Letter to William Cullen, September, 20, 1774, no. 143, Correspondence.
82TMS, I. iii. 3. 5: 63.
83TMS, I. iii. 3. 4: 63.
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to censure their behavior because elite forms of corruption are both legal
and normal.84
Smith’s main purpose in writing about corruption was to confront and cri-
ticize the corrupt yet legal norms of the elite classes, norms that enabled them
to exploit and control those in the lower orders and, in the long run, under-
mine the prosperity of the nation. It was a perverse fact that the vast majority
of people were expected to toil endlessly within the strict conﬁnes of one set of
laws deﬁned by a class whom they emulated and yet who operated within an
alternative and cynically manipulated legal framework.
But when all such “systems either of preference or of restraint” have been
removed, “the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself
of its own accord.”85 In such an order, government can rarely be more effec-
tive than when it is restrained. The system of natural liberty allows only three
proper duties of government, which, though of great importance “are plain
and intelligible to common understanding.” These are, ﬁrst, to protect
society from the invasion of other societies; second, to establish and administer
a system of justice; and ﬁnally, to provide essential public works.86 Beyond
these, the system of “natural liberty” should be left to operate. Although
Smith stipulates that his natural economy cannot operate smoothly without
state intervention in the form of services that the market would not otherwise
be able to provide, his vision of the social and economic system is, nevertheless,
far more self-regulating than legislators had hitherto allowed or understood.87
Ideally, agentswill be permitted the freest possible use of their bodies, minds,
and properties, provided that there are no violations of the system of natural
liberty.88 From Smith’s point of view, England’s poor laws (and, to a lesser
degree, its corporation laws) were the most pernicious constraint on such free-
doms and were detrimental to both individual and public welfare. Poor laws
were more destructive than corporation laws because they disproportionately
disadvantaged the poor.89 Similarly, the laws of apprenticeship were egregious,
not only because they were an impediment to the mobility of labor. but also
because of their tendency to discourage industry and commercial effort.90
84Bear in mind that “custom” and norms play central roles in Smith’s explanation of
the morality generated by the impartial spectator. It is really “custom, which sanctiﬁes
every thing” (LJ (B), 321: 536).
85WN, IV. ix. 51: 687.
86WN, IV. ix. 51: 687–88.
87WN, IV. ix. 51: 687.
88As James Otteson has noted, for Smith a free “market is an opportunity for people
to buy, sell, trade, or otherwise dispose of their belongings with other people however
they see ﬁt” (James Otteson,Adam Smith’s Marketplace of Life [Cambridge: University of
Cambridge Press, 2002], 277).
89WN, I. x. c. 44–5: 152.
90“During his apprenticeship the young man perceives [correctly] that there is no
connection between his effort and his reward [as would exist under piecework], and
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Other obstructions (and therefore corruptions) are epitomized by the
partial and particularistic laws of entail and primogeniture. With regard to
primogeniture, Smith asserted that “nothing can be more contrary to the
real interest of a numerous family, than a right which, in order to enrich
one, beggars all the rest of the children.”91 Meanwhile, the related law of
entail is “founded upon the most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition
that every successive generation of men have not an equal right to the earth,
and to all that it possesses.”92 Though they might have made sense in pre-
vious stages of history, “in the present state of Europe” laws of entail are “con-
trary to nature, to reason, and to justice.”93 Apart from equity considerations,
this system is inefﬁcient due to its tendency to hinder agriculture and devel-
opment;94 in fact, the comparatively rapid development of parts of America is
largely attributable to the absence of such restrictive laws.95
In a comparable vein, Smith vehemently attacked the practice of slavery,
partly because of its cruelty,96 but equally because it is a gross violation of
a person’s natural rights and a breach of the laws of natural liberty.97 This
is demonstrated by its inefﬁcient and maladaptive aspects; slavery is both
an impediment to innovation98 and an inhibitor of population growth,99
both of which are natural phenomena.
Positive Law versus Laws of Natural Liberty
In the abstract and invisible ideal polity of Smith’s imagination, conventional
moral boundaries are sometimes blurry, and the spontaneous laws of natural
liberty do not always coincide with the positive laws of “men.” His attitude to
habits of slothfulness and laziness are therefore encouraged” (Nathan Rosenberg,
“Some Institutional Aspects of the Wealth of Nations,” Journal of Political Economy 68
[February–December 1960]: 557–70, 561); WN, I. x. c. 14–16: 139–40. The laws of
settlement are a similar and therefore unjust restriction on mobility (WN, I. x. c.
58–59: 156–57).
91WN, III. ii. 4: 384.
92WN, III. ii. 6: 384.
93LJ (B): 48.
94WN, III. ii. 7: 385. See also iv. 19: 423.
95WN, IV. vii. b. 19: 572.
96TMS, V. 2. 9: 206–7. Charles Griswold has noted that “Smith was well known as a
critic of slavery and esteemed by abolitionists of his time” (Charles Griswold, Adam
Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999], 198).
97WN, III. ii. 9: 387–88; WN, I. viii. 41: 98–99; WN, IV. ix. 47: 684; LJ (A). iii. 111–12:
185; and LJ (B), 138–40: 453–54; 290: 532; and 299: 526).
98WN, IV. ix. 47: 684.
99LJ (A), iii. 131: 192–93.
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smuggling is a key example. Though he concedes that “no doubt,” the smug-
gler is “highly blameable” for “violating the laws of his country,” neverthe-
less, such a person has in no way violated the more sacred laws “of natural
justice” and is probably an otherwise “excellent citizen, had not the laws
of his country made that a crime which nature never meant to be so (emphasis
added).” In “corrupted” governments where heavy taxes, debt, proﬂigacy,
and waste are the norm, it is not surprising that “the laws which guard it
are little respected.”100 Signiﬁcantly, Smith had a different, and much more
uncompromising, attitude to the crime of theft,101 presumably because it is
an offense that occurs between private and individual consumers rather
than between private citizens and an (allegedly) grasping and rapacious state.
A further telling example is Smith’s attitude to the “dirty practice” of
degree-selling. Rather than condemning it outright, as might be expected,
he simply notes that the poorer universities only engage in it in order to
“turn the penny” in a market—unfairly and therefore unnaturally—oligopo-
lized by the richer institutions.102 Smith does admit that it is a “most disgra-
ceful trade,” and yet he denies emphatically that it is in any way “hurtful to
the public” because the “intolerable nuisance” of exclusive privilege is even
more hurtful; this is due to its unerring tendency to raise the costs of services
to consumers.103 Morally, Smith would have felt justiﬁed in taking this view
on the belief that the laws of natural liberty automatically trump those of mere
mortals.104
Dependency, Commercial Virtues, and the Violation
of Natural Liberty
Smith thought that violations of the laws of natural liberty could have
individuo-psychic as well as social system effects. Dependency, in particular,
is a key corruptor of moral character; therefore, Smith abhorred any paternalis-
tic and dependency-generating remnants of precommercial economic stages.
His alternative was to discover beneath the mess of artiﬁcial legal obstructions
a natural system of nonstate, voluntary, private, nonmonolithic, and
100WN, V. ii. k. 64: 898.
101See John Salter, “Sympathy with the Poor: Theories of Punishment in Hugo
Grotius and Adam Smith,” History of Political Thought 20 (1999): 205–24.
102Letter to William Cullen, September 20, 1774, no. 143, Correspondence. Ian Ross
reports that St Andrews University put itself in this position by conferring an M.D.
on “one Green, who happened to be a stage-doctor, that is, a quack who practiced
medicine on a platform.” (Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995]: 260).
103Letter to William Cullen, September 20, 1774, no. 143, Correspondence.
104See, for example, “History of Ancient Physics,” Essays, 113. For further discussion
of this claim, see Hill, “Hidden Theology,” passim.
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decentralized means for the self-government of people as a means to avoid the
corruption of individual agents, the market, and the nation itself.
Smith welcomed the diffusion of freedom and individual power brought
on by the decline of feudal and aristocratic social arrangements and the con-
comitant breakdown of total forms of governance. His greatest objection to
the feudal age was the necessary dependence associated with the system of
great landholders and retainers. “Dependency” is pernicious because it
breeds servility and fosters asymmetrical and, therefore, unhealthy and
unproductive social relations.105 There is nothing so likely “to corrupt and
enervate and debase the mind as dependency”; conversely “nothing gives
such noble and generous notions of probity as freedom and indepen-
dency.”106 Due to the poverty and indolence it promotes, dependency is
also the root cause of all the “disorder and confusions” that take place in
cities. The solution, according to Smith, is the expansion of “commerce.”107
Because of its capacity to encourage independence, the growth of “commerce
and manufactures” is “the best police for preventing crimes . . . . No body will
be so mad as to expose himself upon the highway, when he can make better
bread in an honest and industrious manner.”108 It is also for the sake of inde-
pendence that Smith advocated high wages; feudal norms of behavior, which
forced workers into obeisance to employers, were aggravated by low wages.
“Masters of all sorts” actually prefer it when harvests are poor and prices high
because it enables them to “make better bargains with their servants . . . and
ﬁnd them more humble and dependent.”109 Monopolies are bad not only
because they distort the market but because they “create artiﬁcial and
one-way dependencies,” thereby corrupting “the characters of both mono-
polizers and monopolized.”110
Smith does not regret the loss of social intimacy occasioned by commerci-
alism and its correlate, urban expansion; the best thing about the commercial
age is its tendency to permit ever increasing degrees of independence and
social distance.111 Precommercial agents had “no other means of persuasion”
105WN, III. iv. 4–7: 412–15; WN, I. ii. 2: 27.
106LJ (A), vi. 6: 333. See also LJ (B), 205: 486–87 and 326: 538.
107LJ (A), v. 4–8: 332–33.
108LJ (B), 205: 486–87.
109WN, I. viii. 48: 101; Michael Perelman, “Adam Smith and Dependent Social
Relations,” History of Political Economy 21 (1989): 312–29, 320–21. Smith also advo-
cated high wages because they encouraged “the industry of the common people”
(WN, I. viii. 44: 99) and boosted population growth. For a fuller discussion, especially
around Smith’s particular anxiety about food security, see Ann Firth, “Moral
Supervision and Autonomous Social Order: Wages and Consumption in Eighteenth
Century Economic Thought,” History of the Human Sciences 15 (2002): 39–57.
110Griswold, Virtues of Enlightenment, 294.
111For a fuller discussion of this claim, see LisaHill and PeterMcCarthy, “On Friendship
and Necessitudo in Adam Smith,” History of the Human Sciences 17 (2004): 1–16.
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by which to obtain their wants than to “gain the favour of those whose
service” was required. That meant having to resort to the humiliating, inefﬁ-
cient, and precarious method of “servile and fawning attention to obtain [the]
good will” of others. In “civilized society” agents are afforded greater inde-
pendence, paradoxically, because each “stands at all times in need of the
co-operation and assistance of great multitudes.” The ability of humans to
specialize and exchange the products of this specialization makes them
“mutually beneﬁciall to each other.”112 The dissolution of the system of
great landholders decentralized dependency relations and offered greater
security to individual trades people: Now “[e]ach tradesman or artiﬁcer
derives his subsistence from the employment, not of one, but of a hundred
or a thousand customers.” Although it is true that s/he remains “in some
measure obliged to them all,” at the same time, “[s]he is not absolutely depen-
dent upon any one of them.”113
Another disadvantage of labor performed inside dependency relationships
(and, therefore, outside market relations) is that it is unproductive; in other
words, it does not result in “vendible” or exchangeable commodities.114 By
comparison, the labor of independent artisans is productive because it is
vendible.115 Further, because of the “the waste which attends rustick hospital-
ity,” productive labor (that is, labor performed by artisans and productive of
vendibles) is able to support a greater number of people.116 Finally, the new
age of independence, competition, and liberty is not only “conducive to
general utility,”117 efﬁciency, and opulence but is also conducive to the culti-
vation of the cool, instrumental, and practical virtues of prudence, justice,
propriety, self-command, frugality, sobriety, vigilance, circumspection,
temperance, constancy, ﬁrmness, punctuality, faithfulness, enterprise, and
industry.118 Though Smith lavishly praised those who exercised the higher,
other-regarding virtues celebrated by classical corruption writers, his moral
focus was on the practical and more attainable forms of virtue that could
and should be exercised by every market actor. Smith’s more modest ideal
was a character who is unlikely to be positively virtuous or beneﬁcent but
could be, at the very least, negatively virtuous, industrious, and self-
governing. Smith seems to have been most interested in—and approving
of—the activities and moral dispositions of the newly emerging class of “mid-
dling” people, those “bustling, spirited, active folks who can’t brook oppres-
sion and are constantly endeavoring to advance themselves.”119
112LJ (A), vi. 46–49: 348–49.
113WN, III. iv. 12: 420.
114Perelman, “Adam Smith and Dependent Social Relations,” 316.
115WN, IV. ix. 31: 675.
116WN, III. iv. 12: 420.
117Griswold, Virtues of Enlightenment, 294.
118WN, II. iii. 36: 345–46; TMS, VII. ii. 3. 15: 304; III. 5. 8: 166.
119LJ (A), v. 124: 320.
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The Division of Labor
Smith’s discussion on the division of labor is noteworthy not least because it
appears to be one of the few sources of corruption he identiﬁes as peculiar to
or induced by the commercial age. It has been argued that Smith’s analysis
here “constitutes a major source of inspiration for the socialist critique
of capitalist institutions.”120 For some scholars, Smith’s critical remarks
represent a civic humanist lament on the loss of “indispensable” civic
virtue.121 It has even been suggested that they should be interpreted as a
sign that he anticipates the decline and eventual annihilation of commercial
societies.122 If this is true, then it might place him more securely in either a
classical or proto-Marxian corruption camp.
Certainly Smith appreciated the alienating effects of the division of labor.
He noted that the worker involved in factory labor “has no occasion to
exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention . . . and generally
becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to
become. . . . His dexterity at his own particular trade seems . . . to be acquired
at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues.”123 Worker
alienation was not a minor phenomenon restricted to a few workers. Smith
indicated that this condition could cause “the almost entire corruption and
degeneracy of the great body of the people . . . in every improved and civilised
society”; moreover, such a tendency seemed inevitable.124
Even so, pessimistic and eschatological interpretations of Smith exaggerate
his concern. It is true that Smith’s outline of the dehumanizing consequences
of specialization on workers does, indeed, foreshadow Marx’s discourse on
the same subject to the extent that it hints at the effects of fragmentation
and product alienation. But the afﬁnity between them should not be over-
estimated. Unlike Marx, Smith regards specialization as a perfectly natural
development originating in an innate urge to “truck, barter and exchange”125
in our inventive, progressive faculties. Most important, as noted above, the
division of labor, even where it extends to martial functions, generates
great levels of liberty and independence for all members of society, including
the working poor. On balance, Smith sees the adverse effects of specialization
120Rosenberg, “Adam Smith on the Division of Labor,” 127–39.
121Griswold, Virtues of Enlightenment, 293. According to Vivienne Brown,
Smith’s discourse “marks out the moral impatience of Stoic moral philosophy for
material goods and worldly ambitions” (Adam Smith’s Discourse [Routledge:
London, 1994], 7). See also Donald Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978), 26.
122Pack, “Adam Smith’s Critique of the Free Market Economy”; Heilbroner, “The
Paradox of Progress,” 243–62.
123WN, V. i. f. 50: 782.
124WN, V. i. f. 49–50: 781–82.
125WN, II. 1: 25.
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more as “inconveniences”126 than anything else, and they are far outweighed
by the beneﬁts. The division of labor is enormously beneﬁcial, generating
almost all of the progress and prosperity of the commercial age.127 In
general, Smith took the view that whatever makes a country rich (and the div-
ision of labor does this better than anything else) enriches the poor also and is,
in the long view, to their beneﬁt.128 From Smith’s point of view, the main
problem with the adverse effect of the division of labor is not the loss of
civic virtue or the imminent collapse of commercialism itself but its largely
ameliorable consequences for public order and personal comportment.
Smith regarded the problem of worker alienation as soluble within existing
social arrangements, namely, through the establishment of a compulsory
and publicly funded school system to inculcate patterns of order and civility
suitable for market society subjects. For Smith, educated people are “more
respectable” and orderly because they are more inclined to acknowledge
the authority of their “lawful superiors.” Therefore, the “state derives no
inconsiderable advantage from the ‘instruction’ of the working poor due
to its projected positive effect on political and social tranquility.”129
Karl Marx was later to deride Smith’s solution as merely “homeo-
phathic.”130 This is, possibly, a fair criticism. Considering the intensity and
extent of the alienation effects Smith describes, his educational solution
seems rather scant. What it reﬂects is his willingness to tolerate a fairly
high degree of moral and intellectual corruption in workers in order to
secure the economically vital society that would beneﬁt such workers in
material ways.
Neither does Smith share Rousseau’s pessimism that the division of labor
(coupled with the development of private property) leads to a culture of
hypocritical selﬁshness and slavish dependency on others. For Rousseau,
after the freedom and independence of the solitary savage has been
exchanged for a sort of modern slavery, people become “sly and artful . . .
imperious and cruel” in order to obtain their never ending wants from
those on whom they are now unavoidably dependent.131 Though Smith
recognizes that specialization is the cause of inequality and appears to
make the lives of the poor worse, there is no nostalgia about the precommer-
cial state of equality; although we might “expect . . . that the savage should be
much better provided than the dependent poor man who labors both for
126LJ (B), 328: 539.
127See, for example, WN, I. i. 10–11: 22–24.
128LJ (B), 212–13: 489–90; Early Draft of Part of the Wealth of Nations, 5–6. in LJ,
563–64.
129WN, V. i. f. 61: 88.
130Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 342.
131Jean Jacques Rousseau, “A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,” in J. J.
Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole (London:
Everyman Library), 96–97.
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himself and for others,” in fact, “the case is far otherwise.”132 Contrast
the forlorn poverty of the age of the savage with the “general security and
happiness that prevails in the ages of civility and politeness.”133 Further, as
we have seen, Smith sees the division of labor as independency-rather than
dependency-generating.
And contrary to Rousseau’s view, commercial societies are more orderly
and just than their “rude and barbarous” predecessors due to the diffusion
of “probity and punctuality” that “always accompan[ies]” the development
of commerce. In fact, the more commercial a nation, the more are its people
“faithfull to their word.” This is all “reducible to self interest, that general
principle which regulates the actions of every man . . . . A dealer is afraid of
losing his character, and is scrupulous in observing every engagement.”134
Religion
Amore threatening source of corruption for Smith is found in religious enthu-
siasm, particularly in cases where it is institutionalized. He was especially
hostile to the manner in which the civil and religious realms had historically
informed one another, and he frequently railed against the conjoined church
and state. One of the worst effects of this union was that “positive law always
has been, and probably always will be . . . inﬂuenced by popular superstition
and enthusiasm.”135 Further, political and religious zealotry are mutually
exacerbating: “Times of violent religious controversy have generally been
times of equally violent political faction.”136 It is important to appreciate
that Smith is not averse to religious belief per se but to expressions of religious
“enthusiasm” that corrupt morality and the “moral sentiments.”137 Religious
enthusiasm obstructs the natural course of progress, science, and civility and
is the enemy of “common sense” and “reason,” hence, its tendency to provoke
social conﬂict and violence. “[F]alse notions of religious duty” engender blind
bigotry and sanctify the most “horrid” acts and “crime[s]” which “common
sense” and natural principles of humanity, “justice and beneﬁcence” would
otherwise condemn.138 Religion teaches the false and dangerous doctrine
132LJ (A), 26: 340. See also WN, I. viii. 1–2: 82.
133TMS, V. 2. 8–9: 205.
134LJ (B), 327: 538.
135WN, V. i. g. 8: 793.
136WN, V. i. g. 6: 791.
137TMS, III. 6. 12: 176; 3. 43: 155–56. It is worth noting that Smith makes one excep-
tion in his general hostility to organized religion. Of the Presbyterian Church, he
wrote: “There is scarce perhaps to be found any where in Europe a more learned,
decent, independent, and respectable set of men, than the greater part of the presby-
terian clergy of Holland, Geneva, Switzerland, and Scotland” (WN, V. i. g. 37: 810).
For explanation, see Rosenberg, “Some Institutional Aspects,” 568.
138TMS, III. 6. 12–13: 176–77.
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that such “frivolous observances” as “sacriﬁces . . . ceremonies and vain sup-
plications” are a legitimate means to “bargain with the Deity for fraud, and
perﬁdy, and violence.”139 Religious zealotry is conceived as a deviation
from a natural state, namely, a calm belief in that pure, untainted, and spon-
taneous form of “natural religion” which soothes rather than agitates. Smith
approved of the natural theology or “scientiﬁc religion” of Stoicism because
of its organic interpretation of the universe as a designed and integrated
“system, governed by general laws and directed to general ends, viz. its
own preservation and prosperity.”140 Such moderate and scientiﬁc forms of
religious belief can even be beneﬁcial, for when people believe they “are
always acting under the eye, and exposed to the punishment of God . . . the
most headstrong” and violent “passions” can be contained.141 Smith also
reserved a role for religious sects as an antidote to the isolating and demora-
lizing aspects of urban life.142 At the same time, he is careful to remind his
reader that this is only the case “wherever the natural principles of religion
are not corrupted by the factious and party zeal of some worthless
cabal”;143 in other words, where religion has yet to be domesticated in such
a way as to engender rather than disrupt social order.
Smith apparently longed for a quieter, tamer world, free from sectarian vio-
lence and bloody, seemingly endless war. But peace and tranquility might at
last be possible in a world where the monolithic power of religion had, on the
one hand, been broken by its decoupling from politics and, on the other, suit-
ably tamed by the forces of competition. Under free-market conditions, where
the particularistic, intolerant, monopolistic, institutional, and obligatory
aspects of religion have been dispelled and “the natural principles of religion”
allowed to reign, religion might even have positive effects.
Of equal concern to Smith was the hegemonic power of the Christian Church
due to its enjoyment of a state-protected monopoly; this not only enabled it to
wield noxious levels of power but also constituted a violation of the laws of
natural liberty. Smith believed that the only tolerable religions were those
that had been subjected to the trials and rigors of the market. He offers a
thought experiment in disestablishment that favors the idea of a society
divided into hundreds, even “thousand[s]” of small sects. Competition
between a diversity of independent denominations would not only prevent
any single one of them from becoming a threat to “the publick tranquillity”
but it would also generate the kind of religious freedom Smith valued.144
139TMS, III. 5. 13: 170.
140Adam Smith, “History of Ancient Physics” in Essays 9: 113; 11: 116–17. See also
“History of Astronomy,” 76: 104–5.
141TMS, III. 5. 12: 170.
142WN, V. i. g. 12: 795–96.
143TMS, III. 5. 12: 170.
144Whereby “every man” could “chuse his own priest and his own religion as he
thought proper” (WN, V. i. g. 8: 792).
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Where a plurality of sects operated in open competition, a culture of tolerance
and mutual respect would likely develop and eventually (or at least hopefully)
“the doctrine of the greater part of [the sects would be reduced] to that pure
and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fana-
ticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to see estab-
lished.”145 However, Smith also noted that even such relatively powerless
sects could still be hazardous if not checked; therefore, in order to offset their
“disagreeably rigorous and unsocial” tendencies and to prevent them from
promulgating “that melancholy and gloomy humor which is almost always
the nurse of popular superstition and enthusiasm,” he recommended the
state subsidization of “publick diversions,” among them “painting, poetry,
musick, dancing . . . [and] all sorts of dramatic representations and
exhibitions.”146
Thus, Smith wasn’t necessarily opposed to organized religion but rather to
those monolithic, monopolizing churches intent on fostering particularistic
fanaticism, bigotry, and unreason.147 This attitude meshes with his more
general desiderata for the modern world, a world he hoped would be
neutral, impartial, increasingly private, ruled by constitutions and predictable
and positive laws, and inhabited by agents of moderate, tolerant, dispassio-
nate, reasonable, and orderly moral disposition.
Faction
Another source of corruption for Smith is political conﬂict in general and
political factions in particular. Like most neoclassical republicans, Smith dis-
liked the fact that factions could capture political institutions in order to serve
sectional interests, referring to their tendency to “deceive and impose upon
the Public” and “oppress” rather than serve government.148 But he had
other reasons for his dislike of factional conﬂict. Faction “distract[s] the
nation” and is equal to the vice of “fanaticism” in its capacity to corrupt
morality and the “moral sentiments.” In fact “[o]f all the corrupters of
moral sentiment . . . faction and fanaticism have always been by far the great-
est.” Factions corrupt the moral sentiments because where faction prevails,
145WN, V. i. g. 8: 792–93; David Levy, “Adam Smith’s ‘Natural Law’and Contractual
Society,” Journal of the History of Ideas 39 (October–December 1978): 665–74, 674.
146WN, V. i. g. 12. 15: 796. This does suggest that he was less than sure that such sects
would be as rational as was desirable.
147WN, V. i. g. 24: 802–3. These two potential sources of Smithian optimism are
noted by James Alvey in “Adam Smith’s View of History”: 11. See also Peter
McNamara, Political Economy and Statesmanship (De Kalb: Northern Illinois
University Press, 1998), 51.
148Smith, letter addressed to Le Duc de la Rochefoucauld, Edinburgh, November 1,
1785, no. 248, Correspondence.
660 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
the impartial spectator is disarmed. In the midst of “the violence and rage of
contending parties,” the impartial spectator ceases to exist altogether and so,
therefore, does good “judgment,” candor, and fair play.149 The behavior of
factions is generally “atrocious” violent, and unjust,150 and they have
always worked to fan the terrible ﬁres of sectarian conﬂict.151 Smith dispar-
aged all forms of conﬂict and social disharmony; in fact, “[t]he peace and
order of society, is of more importance than even the relief of the miser-
able.”152 Once a sound constitution has been put in place,153 politics seems
to have been reducible to the rational administration of populations and
the management of the practical exigencies of security, both economic and
military. As he wrote famously: “Little else is requisite to carry a state to
the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy
taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about
by the natural course of things.”154 The “prudent man,” though not especially
lovable or praiseworthy, does not take on any unnecessary public responsibil-
ities, avoids “meddl[ing],” and “conﬁnes himself, as much as his duty will
permit, to his own affairs.” Further, if he is wise, he will be “averse to enter
into any party disputes.”155 Again, this attitude contrasts with the classical
approach to corruption in which active citizenship and other-regarding
public spirit are promoted as the main guards of constitutions. For Smith, a
directly opposite kind of character is the preserver of his natural physics.
Concluding Remarks
Though Smith was keenly aware of “the disadvantages of a commercial
spirit,” he seems more convinced that commercialization is natural, inevita-
ble, and basically positive. His views are ultimately those of an early liberal
political economist whereby corruption is seen to consist in deviations from
a natural (broadly liberal) state. In a sense, most early liberalism was,
almost by deﬁnition, an implicit reaction to corruption (understood here in
its modern sense), and Smith can be safely bracketed in the modern camp
due to his sustained defense of such standard liberal values as impartiality,
149TMS, III. 3. 43: 155–56; Hume agreed (letter from Hume to Smith, February 13,
1774, no. 141, Correspondence).
150TMS, V. iiii. 12: 242; III. 3. 25: 146.
151WN, V. i. g. 7: 791–92.
152TMS, Vi. ii. 1. 20: 226; TMS, VI. ii. 2. 12: 231.
153Characterized by such features as the separation of powers and judicial indepen-
dence (WN, V. i. b. 25: 722–23).
154“As reported by Dugald Stewart from a document no longer in existence in his
Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith in his Collected Works, ed. Sir William
Hamilton (1858) 10: 68” (cited inWinch,Adam Smith’s Politics, 4. n. 2, emphasis added).
155TMS, VI. i. 13: 215–16.
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universalism, neutrality, liberty, formal equality of opportunity, and rule of
law. At the same time, he comprehends—but does not show much interest
in—the typical concerns of modern corruption reformers.
But he pays even less heed to the anxieties of classical theorists. There is no
defense of classical virtue and no positive conception of an ideal constitution.
Moral corruption does not arise from political apathy, hedonism, selﬁshness,
or an inattention to the public sphere (as per classical accounts). It is instead a
product of redundant and archaic social phenomena like religious enthu-
siasm, political zealotry and faction ﬁghting, and restrictive and oppressive
economic arrangements. Social system and individuo-psychic level corrup-
tion is generated by sluggish, paternalistic, particularistic, and dependency-
generating forms of governance and control; by heavy taxation; a debt-ridden
economy; and a state captured by religious and sectional interests at the
expense of individual consumers. The unnaturally overmanaged economy
of dependent, fractious, superstitious, and indolent agents imperils both the
economy and the moral health of individual agents. Smith seeks to
promote not the intimate community of politically virtuous souls but the
progressive, expanding, and solvent commercial polity of independent and
self-regarding producers and consumers.
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